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Abstract
Research related to alias protection and related concepts, such as, conﬁned types and ownership types has
a long tradition and is a promising concept for the design and implementation of more reliable and secure
software. Unfortunately, the use of these concepts is not widespread as most implementations are proofs
of concept and fall short with respect to the integration with standard software development tools and
processes.
In this paper, we discuss an implementation of conﬁned types based on Java 5 annotations. The contribution
of this paper is twofold: First, we discuss the incrementalization of the conﬁned types analysis and second,
we present the integration of the analysis into Eclipse using the static analysis platform Magellan.
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1 Introduction
Unintended aliasing is causing many kinds of problems. For example aliasing makes
modular reasoning more diﬃcult, as it is hard to reason about the eﬀect of updating
an object o when it is unknown which other objects also keep a reference to o.
Besides being a source of programming errors that can be detected when testing
an application, unintended aliasing can also lead to security errors, which are hard to
detect using standard development techniques. For example, when a reference to an
object is passed to another object and, hence, an alias is created for the ﬁrst object,
then the alias can later on be used to update the ﬁrst object in an unanticipated
manner. In [19] a security breach caused by a reference leaking bug in the JDK 1.1
is discussed (shown in Listing 1). In the JDK’s implementation, each instance of a
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1 public class Class {
2 private Identity [] signers ;
3 public Identity [] getSigners() {
4 return signers;
5 } }
Listing 1: Class.getSigners() without Conﬁned Types
Java Class object holds an array of signers (Line 2) that represents the principals
under which the class acts. The problem is that the getSigners method returns
a reference to the original signers array (Line 4). Hence, the attackers can then
freely update the signatures based on their needs.
To solve the problems related to the creation of unintended aliases, we need
means to enforce that important data structures can not escape the scope of a well
deﬁned protection domain. For example, to assure that the reference to the original
signers array does not escape the declaring class. In [19], Vitek et Bokowski propose
the concept of Conﬁned Types to solve issues related to object aliasing.
In this paper, we present an incremental analysis for the conﬁned types concept
proposed in [19] and integrate this analysis into the incremental build process of
the Eclipse IDE [7]. One goal of our work was compatibility with the Java language
speciﬁcation and existing tools. This was a major reason why we have chosen
Conﬁned Types [19]; using Java annotations we were able to simulate the necessary
language extensions proposed by Vitek et Bokowski.
The main contribution of our work is to provide an implementation of the con-
ﬁned type checking that is tightly integrated with a standard software development
environment and where the analysis exhibits a behavior that is indistinguishable
from other (standard) compile time analyses. This ﬁts well in the development phi-
losophy supported by modern IDEs such as Eclipse, where the developer expects to
see e.g., typing problems as soon as they emerge as the project evolves.
In general, we argue that — whenever possible — checking various program
properties should be done by IDEs. This avoids bloated compilers and ensures that
application-speciﬁc checkers can be introduced when needed. However, (re)checking
the entire project after a change is prohibitively expensive w. r. t. the time required
for the analysis. Hence, violations of the typing rules for conﬁned types should be
checked for incrementally.
In vein of these considerations, we have implemented the conﬁnement rules de-
ﬁned in [19] using the open, extensible static analysis platform Magellan [9], which
is tightly integrated into the Eclipse IDE [7]. By choosing Magellan and Eclipse as
the underlying frameworks many issues related to tool adoption [1,10] are already
solved. By building on top of Magellan, our analysis is automatically integrated
with the incremental build process. Hence, the user will — after activation — per-
ceive no diﬀerence between the checks carried out by the standard Java compiler
and our analysis. This ﬂattens the learning curve, as it is not necessary to learn
how to use the tool, provided the developer is already familiar with Eclipse. Ad-
ditionally, since we (re)use the standard Eclipse views to visualize errors no user
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interface related issues arise.
This paper is structured as follows: In the following, we ﬁrst give an overview
of conﬁned types. After that, we introduce the static analysis platform Magellan
on top of which we have build our analysis. We continue with a presentation of the
implementation of the conﬁned types analysis, and in particular, the issues related
to the incrementalization of the analysis. After that, we evaluate our approach by
using conﬁned types in a large project. We conclude with a discussion of related
work and a summary.
2 Conﬁned Types
Conﬁned Types were proposed by Vitek and Bokowski [19] as a machine checkable
programming discipline that prevents leaks of sensitive object references. A moti-
vation for their work was the security breach mentioned in the indroduction (shown
in Listing 1).
A possible solution to avoid the breach is a programming style that encourages
the developers of classes with sensitive information to return a reference to a copy
of the sensitive data, in our case a copy of the signers array. While programming
styles cannot be enforced, using conﬁned types ensures that none of the key data
structures used in code signing escape the scope of their deﬁning package.
For this purpose, types whose instances should not leave their deﬁning package
are marked as conﬁned. Conﬁnement ensures that objects of a conﬁned type can
only be accessed within a certain protection domain. A type is conﬁned to this
domain if all references to objects of that type originate from within the domain.
Code outside the protection domain is never allowed to manipulate conﬁned objects
directly. In contrast to existing access control mechanisms in Java (such as the Java
private keyword), conﬁnement constrains access to object references rather than
classes. It prevents class-based restrictions from being circumvented by casting the
protected object to one of its unrestricted super-types.
In this paper, we describe an incremental analysis for the proposal in [19], inte-
grated into the incremental build process of the Eclipse IDE. As proposed in [19],
we also use Java packages as protection domains. Instead of the new modiﬁers,
confined and anon, introduced in [19], we use the metadata facility (annotations)
introduced in Java 5.0 and deﬁne two annotation types: @confined and @anon.
Listing 2 shows, how the code from Listing 1 can be rewritten using conﬁned
types. The annotation @confined is used with a class, whose objects should be
conﬁned to the containing package. In Listing 2, annotating SecureIdentity
as @confined (Line 3) enforces references to SecureIdentity objects to be con-
ﬁned to the package java.security. Thus, code outside this package can never
access instances of type SecureIdentity. Renaming the old Identity class to
SecureIdentity and introducing a new Identity class (Line 4 – 8) preserves the
functionality of the original interface.
The @anon annotation enables conﬁned types to safely use methods from uncon-
ﬁned types. Methods that do not reveal the current object’s identity are marked
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1 package java.security;
2 abstract class AbstractIdentity { @anon equals(){...}; }
3 @conﬁned class SecureIdentity extends AbstractIdentity { ... }
4 public class Identity {
5 SecureIdentity target ;
6 Identity (SecureIdentity t) { target = t; }
7 ... // public operations on identities ;
8 }
9 public class Class {
10 private SecureIdentity[] signers ;
11 public Identity [] getSigners( ) {
12 Identity [] pub = new Identity[signers.length];
13 for (int i = 0; i < signers.length; i++)
14 pub[i] = new Identity(signers[i ]);
15 return pub;
16 }
17 }
Listing 2: Class.getSigners() using Conﬁned Types
as anonymous by annotating them with @anon to show this intention and to make
this property checkable 6 . In Listing 2, the method equals in line 2 is marked with
@anon to show that it never reveals the current instance’s identity (this-reference).
Therefore, SecureIdentity can safely extend AbstractIdentity and call equals
on this, because no method marked @anon will breach the conﬁnement.
The constraints in Table 1 and 2 are deﬁned in [19] and deﬁne the semantics of
confined and anon. Constraints in Table 1 restrict class and interface declarations
(C1, C2), prevent widening (C3), hidden widening (C4, C5), and transfers from
inside (C6) and outside (C7, C8) the protection domain. The rules deﬁned in Table
2 constrain the usage of the self-reference this in method implementations, so that
this is not revealed to code outside the method.
C1 A conﬁned class or interface must not be declared public and must not belong to the unnamed
global package.
C2 Subtypes of a conﬁned type must be conﬁned as well.
C3 Widening of references from a conﬁned type to an unconﬁned type is forbidden in assignments,
method call arguments, return statements, and explicit casts.
C4 Methods invoked on a conﬁned object must either be non-native methods deﬁned in a conﬁned
class or be anonymous methods.
C5 Constructors called from the constructor of a conﬁned class must either be deﬁned by a conﬁned
class or be anonymous constructors.
C6 Subtypes of java.lang.Throwable and java.lang.Thread may not be conﬁned.
C7 The declared type of public and protected ﬁelds in unconﬁned types may not be conﬁned.
C8 The return type of public and protected methods in unconﬁned types may not be conﬁned.
Table 1
Constraints for conﬁned types
Using conﬁned types as an extension to the Java type system, the programming
style of returning only copies of sensitive data can be supported in such a way that
once a type is marked as @confined, the safety of the program with respect to
avoiding unintended reference leaking can be guaranteed.
6 Another possibility would be to infer the @anon property. But having it explicit as an annotation in the
code serves as a documented design decision.
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A1 The reference this can only be used for accessing ﬁelds and calling anonymous methods of the
current instance or for object reference comparisons.
A2 Anonymity of methods and constructors must be preserved in subtypes.
A3 Constructors called from an anonymous constructor must be anonymous.
A4 Native methods may not be declared anonymous.
Table 2
Constraints for anonymous methods
3 Magellan
In this section, we discuss the static analysis platform Magellan. Magellan is a
generic, extensible platform for static analyses, which is tightly integrated into the
Eclipse IDE. The part of the architecture of Magellan relevant for this paper is
depicted in Fig. 1. The types in the highlighted area (Checker, ProblemsViewRE
and Report) are extended or used by classes of our conﬁned types analysis. In the
following, we brieﬂy discuss the functionality of the central classes and interfaces
and the interaction between them.
Fig. 1. Diagram of the main classes and interfaces
3.1 Source Artifact Processors
Source artifact processors create representations of program elements deﬁned in the
ﬁles of a project. The representations, which are appropriate for static analysis are
called source artifacts and are stored in the database that is part of Magellan’s core
module; the database is basically a map that associates an Eclipse resource with
artifacts generated by the processors.
The source artifact processor relevant for the conﬁnement analysis uses the Java
Bytecode Analysis Toolkit BAT [8] to create a quadruples 7 based representation of
7 Please note, the term quadruple and 3-address instruction are used interchangeable [17, p. 479].
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Java class ﬁles. The representation is similar to the Jimple representation of the Soot
framework [18] and is essentially a register based representation of Java bytecode.
A quadruples based representation facilitates many analyses, in particular data-ﬂow
analyses [17,18], when compared with a direct representation of Java bytecode as
generated by other bytecode toolkits, such as e. g., BCEL [2].
3.2 Linked Artifact Processors
A linked artifact processor creates representations of resources that are not directly
deﬁned as part of the project, but which are relevant for the analysis of the project.
E. g., classes in the Java runtime library are not deﬁned as part of the project, but
information about them is required by many analyses.
Representations generated by linked artifact processors are called linked artifacts
and are also stored in the database. The linked artifact processor used by the
conﬁned types analysis processes the source artifacts generated from Java class
ﬁles. The algorithm that this processor uses to determine the set of linked artifacts
to add to the database is described next. The representations of all classes deﬁned
in libraries that are directly used in the implementation of the classes of the project
are added. Next, the same process is recursively applied to each linked artifact
added previously until every class used by any other class is added.
In particular, this algorithm ensures, that representations of the super types of
every used type are made available. For illustration, assume that the only class in
our project is the following:
class A { java.lang. Iterable l ; }
In the ﬁrst step, the algorithm adds a representation of the interface Iterable to
the database — the type of the declared ﬁeld. Further, the class java.lang.Object
is added, since every class inherits from it. In the second step, the representations
of Object and Iterable are analyzed. Since Object is the top-most type and
Iterable does not extend any interfaces, no further classes need to be added. To
reduce the size of the database, private methods and ﬁelds, as well as the methods’
implementations are omitted.
3.3 Base Analyses
The program model generated by the source and linked artifact processors is en-
riched and rendered more precise by applying base analyses that exploit general-
purpose program analysis techniques, e.g., class hierarchy, control-ﬂow or data-ﬂow
analysis. Our conﬁnement analysis uses the following two base analyses provided by
Magellan: (a) the hierarchy analysis to make information about the super-/subtypes
of a class directly available, and (b) an analysis to bring the quadruples representa-
tion in SSA form [6]. When the representation is in SSA form, the local variables’
deﬁnition-use and use-deﬁnition information is directly available. This enables a
straightforward implementation of the check that the this reference of a conﬁned
type is not passed to another object. For each value passed to another object or re-
turned by the method, we have to check if the this reference is potentially assigned
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to it. To do so, we analyze the explicitly available use-deﬁnition information.
3.4 Evaluation Engines
Conceptually, an evaluation engine is a mediator between the Magellan core and
a set of so-called checker modules. A checker module analyzes the models about
the program, generated by the processors and base analyses, to derive higher-level
information about the “correctness” of the program. The result of a checker is
directly presented to the end user of a Magellan enabled IDE. For example, a result
could be that a conﬁnement rule [19] of a class is violated. The evaluation engine we
are using for the conﬁnement analysis enables to write checkers that directly work on
the quadruples based representation. This evaluation engine provides a lightweight
plug-in interface: Each checker must implement a small Checker interface to enable
the evaluation engine (a) to determine the analyses and processors required by the
checker and (b) to start the evaluation process.
3.5 Reporting Engines
A reporting engine displays the results of an analysis. During the evaluation of the
database, reports that describe ﬁndings of the checkers are generated and passed to
the reporting engines. Each reporting engine supports a speciﬁc reporting format.
In our case, we use the simplest form of a report: a short descriptive text such as
“this must not be passed to another class” associated with a particular arti-
fact element. The reporting engine for this simple format uses the Problems View
of Eclipse to display the generated reports. These reports consist of a short mes-
sage, a severity level, a reference to the underlying resource and the speciﬁcation of
a source range to which the message refers.
3.6 The Magellan Core
The Magellan core is responsible for controlling the analysis process. The analysis
process is triggered by an incremental or a full build. We will ﬁrst describe the
incremental build process. A high-level overview of the analysis process triggered
by an incremental build is depicted in Fig. 2.
First, a BuildReport is created and used to record all changes to the database.
The core uses the information passed to it (by Eclipse) to remove all artifacts from
the database whose underlying resource has changed or was removed. The removed
artifacts are added to the build report and are available until the end of the analysis
process. The core passes each resource that has changed or which was added to all
processors to obtain respective artifacts. When an artifact is returned, the core
adds it to the database and to the build report. Second, the core passes the build
report to the ﬁrst linked artifact processor. The processor uses the information
stored in the database and in the build report to determine the set of resources for
which it needs to create linked artifacts. Third, the base analyses are executed.
After performing all analyses, the build report also records the information about
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Fig. 2. Activity diagram of the build process
the artifacts where the analysis information has changed. Finally, the core calls the
evaluation engines which then execute the registered checkers.
In case of a full build, the process is basically the same as described above,
except that ﬁrst the entire database is cleared and the source artifact processors are
called for all ﬁles of the project. After that, the same steps are executed as in case
of an incremental build.
4 Incremental Analysis
As stated in [19], checking the conﬁnement rules is modular in the sense that each
class can be analyzed separately. However, in addition to modularity and dynamic
loading [19], our aim is to also support (a) continuous checking of conﬁnement
constraints during a programming task, and (b) IDE-Integration of the checking
process with an integrated error reporting and source code navigation, as illustrated
by the screenshot in Fig. 3.
In such a setting, checking all constraints on all classes after every change is
obviously prohibitive in terms of incremental build performance. However, deter-
mining which classes have to be reanalyzed after a set of arbitrary changes to the
project’s source code is non-trivial. For an example of how a small change can
impact the conﬁnement rules at a seemingly unrelated location, consider Listing 3.
1 package x;
2 public class X1 {
3 @anon public void m() { /∗ ... ∗/ }
4 }
5 public class X2 {
6 public void m() { /∗ ... ∗/ }
7 }
8
9 package y;
10 public class Y extends X1 { } /∗ change: ... extends X2 ∗/
11
12 package z;
13 @conﬁned class Z extends Y { /∗ ... ∗/ }
14 class W {
15 public void foo() {
16 Z z = new Z();
17 z.m(); /∗ will violate C4 after change ∗/
M. Eichberg et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 164 (2006) 81–9688
Fig. 3. Screenshot of Eclipse when using Conﬁned Types
18 } }
Listing 3: Indirect violation of conﬁnement constraints
The example consists of Java classes in three diﬀerent packages. Class W calls a
method m on a conﬁned class Z. C4 is satisﬁed because Z inherits m from class X1
where it is declared anonymous. Now, let us assume that Y is changed to inherit
from X2 instead of X1. Since X2 does not declare m as anonymous, the method call
in Line 17 now violates constraint C4. Hence, a change in package y (which does
not contain any conﬁned or anonymous declarations) yields a conﬁnement error in
a class in package z that is neither a subtype nor a supertype of the changed class
Y.
The example shows that when a class changes, it is not suﬃcient to only check
classes in the same package / protection domain or all super-types and subtypes of
the changed class. We therefore employ a more systematic approach to develop an
incremental algorithm for checking the conﬁnement rules.
Our checking algorithm is designed in two steps. First, given a list of classes that
have been changed a set of classes is identiﬁed that must be reanalyzed to discover
any new constraint violation and to remove any error message for constraints that
are no longer violated. Next, the constraint rules are checked for all classes returned
by the ﬁrst step. Whenever a check fails an error report for the Eclipse problems
view is created and presented to the user (see Fig. 3). Hence, after editing a source
ﬁle the developer is immediately informed about constraint violations.
We regard all the constraints from Table 1 and Table 2 as predicates over classes,
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respectively over methods. For any class c, Ci(c) is true, if and only if c satisﬁes Ci
for any method m, Ai(m) is true only if m satisﬁes the constraint Ai. Each predicate
can be evaluated on its own, since the deﬁnitions of the constraints do not depend
on each other. For example, for a class c to satisfy constraint C4 it suﬃces that
methods called on conﬁned types within c are declared as anonymous. Whether
these methods, in turn, satisfy the constraints for anonymous methods is irrelevant
for C4, though. The reason is that error messages are directly related to predicates
that are not fulﬁlled. Violations of the constraints for anonymous methods will be
displayed as separate errors when analyzing the respective methods.
Now we can state our problem as follows: Given a program, the predicate values
for all its classes and methods, and a set of classes changed in the process of an
incremental build, update the predicate values so that they reﬂect the program
changes. This update process should be correct in the sense that it produces the
same results as a whole-program analysis.
Since a constraint must only be reevaluated if some information it depends on
has been invalidated by a program change we determine for each constraint the set
of information it depends on.
Before doing so, we slightly modify the constraints C2 to C2′: “If a direct super-
type of a type t is conﬁned, t must be conﬁned as well.”, and A2 to A2′: “If a method
m directly overrides an anonymous method, m must be anonymous as well.” These
modiﬁcations, while reducing the information on which the values of C2 and A2
predicates depend on, do not aﬀect the semantics of the conﬁned types: A program
satisﬁes all the constraints from Table 1 and Table 2 if and only if it satisﬁes them
with C2 and A2 replaced by C2′ and A2′.
We start our analysis by investigating the rules for anonymous methods, as
deﬁned in Table 2.
• A1(m) depends on the anonymous attribute of all methods called on this inside
m. These methods have been declared either in m’s class or in a super-type of
the latter. Hence, for any changed class c, A1(m) must be reevaluated for any m
in c or any of its subtypes.
• A2′(m) depends on the anonymous attribute of the method overridden by m.
Since such a method must be declared in a super-type of m’s class, the same
invalidation strategy as for A1 applies.
• Since calls to constructors from within a constructor can be seen as a special kind
of method calls on this, we can treat A3 in the same way as A1.
• A4 does not depend on any non-local information. Thus, it suﬃces to reevaluate
A4 on all methods of a changed class.
This leads to the following incremental algorithm for checking the constraints
from Table 2. Whenever a type t changes, we have to reevaluate constraints A1–A3
on all subtypes of t (including t itself). Constraint A4 only has to be reevaluated
for types that have been changed.
Next, the constraints in Table 1 are analyzed in the same way.
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• C1(c) only depends on information from the class c. Thus, for every c, which has
changed, C1(c) must be reevaluated.
• C2′(c) depends on the conﬁned attribute of all direct super-types of c. Thus, we
have to reevalute C2′(c) for any c that is a direct subtype of a changed class c′.
• C3(c) depends on the conﬁned attribute of the types used in widenings inside one
of c’s methods. The value of C3(c) can change only if either c is changed (so that
the list of widenings performed inside c has changed) or if the conﬁned attribute
of a type t that is used in a widening changes. For each such t, the following
holds: t has been conﬁned at some point (i. e., before or after the change), hence,
t is deﬁned within the same package as c. Therefore, for each class c whose
conﬁned attribute has changed C3 needs to be reevaluated for any class in the
same package as a class c.
• C4(c) depends on method calls in c where the static type of the receiver is con-
ﬁned. More speciﬁcally, it depends on the conﬁned attribute of the method’s
declaring type and the method’s anonymous attribute.
Since the static receiver type is conﬁned, it must be in the same package as the
class that contains the method call. Thus, whenever the conﬁned attribute of a
type t changes, C4(c) must be reevaluated for any class c in the same package as
t to recheck all relevant method calls on t.
Additionally, we have to reevaluate C4 when the anonymous attribute of the
called method changes. This can happen indirectly as we have seen in the example
from Listing 3. Thus, whenever a type t is changed we have to determine all classes
that call a method on a conﬁned subtype t′ of t. Since a conﬁned type can only
be package visible, such a class must be in the same package as t′. For every
conﬁned subclass t′ of t we check C4(c) for all classes c in t′’s package.
• The constraint C5(c) considers constructor calls in constructors of conﬁned classes.
Since constructors are not inherited in Java, they have to be in the same class
or in the direct superclass (can be called via super(...)). This implies that C5
depends only on the class itself and its superclass. When a class c is changed, we
reevaluate C5 for c and all direct subtypes.
• C6(c) depends on all super-classes of c. Thus, it suﬃces to reevaluate C6 for all
subclasses of c whenever c is changed. As an optimization, we can ignore changes
to c that do not change c’s super-types.
• C7(c) can change whenever the conﬁned attribute of a type used in a public or
protected ﬁeld declaration of c changes. Since such a ﬁeld type either was conﬁned
before the change or has become conﬁned after the change, it has to be in the
same package as c. Thus, whenever a type t changes C7 needs to be reevaluated
for all classes in the same package as t.
• The constraint C8(c) checks return types of methods that are declared as public
or protected. The strategy for evaluating C8 is the same as for C7.
Given a set of ﬁles that have been changed, we process every constraint sep-
arately. For every changed class we compute the set of classes that have to be
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reanalyzed and then reevaluate the constraint against all classes in this set 8 . This
process is correct even if multiple changes have been performed, because it analyzes
the same classes that would have been analyzed if an incremental analysis had been
performed after every change.
By deﬁnition, the rules for computing the set of classes to be checked after a
change guarantee that a constraint is reevaluated if any information it depends on
has been invalidated. Hence, the value of all predicates is the same as if they had
been evaluated by performing a whole-program analysis. Thus, our incremental
algorithm is correct. Regarding its eﬃciency, with the current rules we often have
to reevaluate a constraint for all subtypes of some type. Obviously, this may be a
very big set. Suppose, for example, that the class Object is changed somehow. Now,
constraints A1–A3 for example have to be reevaluated for all subtypes of Object
which essentially is every type.
A possible optimization is to use a call-graph analysis to reduce the reevaluations
of constraints A1 and C4. This is because, we could determine all method call
statements that are aﬀected by a given change. For the change from Listing 3, for
example, the call-graph analysis would tell us that the method called in Line 17 has
changed and we could reevaluate C4 for this location. This avoids having to check
constraints A1 and C4 for all classes in a package. The challenge, of course, is to
make call-graph analysis incremental as the cost would be prohibitive otherwise and
to make it fast enough to pay oﬀ compared to our current algorithm.
5 Performance Evaluation
The runtime complexity of static analyses is an important obstacle for their widespread
adoption; performance is especially crucial for an integration into the build process.
To assess our analysis in this respect, we measured its runtime while refactoring
the Java runtime library to implement the suggestions made in [12]. The experi-
ment was conducted on a dual Xeon 3.0Ghz workstation with 2GB RAM running
Windows XP and the Sun Java 5 JDK.
We edited the “public” part of the Java 5 runtime library (rt.jar) delivered
with the Sun JDK, which consists of 4992 classes in java.*, javax.* and org.*.
Furthermore, 441 classes were added to the database by the linked artifact processor
for classes in sun* and com.sun*; these classes are used in the implementation of
the public classes.
To keep the artifacts, the hierarchy information and the results of the conﬁne-
ment analysis in memory≈ 85MB are required. The overall time for the ﬁrst analysis
process (full build, without conﬁnement annotations) of the project is 46.5 seconds;
the supporting analyses require 45.7 seconds and the analysis of the conﬁned types
(Confinement Analysis) 0.7 seconds.
The time required to perform the analysis during incremental builds is shown
on the y-axis in Fig. 4. The numbers on the x-axis are identiﬁers for diﬀerent
8 For simplicity, we just compute the union of all these sets and check all constraints against every class in
this set.
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Fig. 4. Incremental build times (msecs)
refactorings that we performed:
(i) A complex class (1578 LOC) is changed; the change does not aﬀect conﬁned
types.
(ii) The implementation of an anonymous method is changed, whose declaring class
does not have conﬁned subclasses.
(iii) A method in a conﬁned class is changed; the change does not violate any
conﬁnement constraints.
(iv) A method is annotated as anonymous which is inherited and used by a conﬁned
subclass.
(v) The annotation added in the previous case is removed to force the creation of
an error message.
(vi) A class is annotated as conﬁned in a package that previously did not deﬁne
any conﬁned types.
(vii) The conﬁned annotation of the most recently annotated class in a package is
removed.
The results show that in case of an incremental build the time required to per-
form the necessary analyses is in general less than 200 milliseconds 9 . Further, the
additional amount of memory required is at most 85MB. These results indicate
that it is feasible to run the conﬁnement analysis along with the incremental build
process.
9 Please note that the automatic parallelization of the artifact processors reduces the required time for
processing the source ﬁles by ≈ 35%− 40% when compared to a single CPU conﬁguration.
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6 Related Work
When dealing with aliasing, four categories of work are considered [14]: detection,
prevention, control and advertisement of aliasing. The works we are interested in,
mostly fall under the category of prevention and control.
The notion of alias protection for object-oriented languages was introduced by
Hogg [13] in order to enable modular reasoning for groups of classes. These groups
are called islands and ensure the restriction of aliasing to classes on the island.
Hogg diﬀerentiates between static and dynamic aliases. Static aliases are aliases via
instance variables and dynamic aliases are those via parameters or local variables.
Static aliasing can lead to undesired side eﬀects in later invocations of the aliased
object. Dynamic aliases were seen as unproblematic, because they disappear at the
end of the execution of the method in which they are deﬁned. Means to control
static aliasing were introduced with islands. Islands are the transitive closure of a
set of objects accessible from a bridge object. A bridge object is the sole access
point to a set of instances that make up an island.
To ensure that no static aliases are created from outside the island to objects
on the island, the methods of the bridge object are restricted. Only methods with
parameters and return values that either do not modify the state of the system,
or have only parameters and return values that have at most one static alias are
allowed. This avoids the creation of unwanted aliases. For example, a return value of
a method can be tagged with unique to state that exactly one reference to its value
exists. The value can only be assigned to other variables, if the original reference is
released.
The full encapsulation of aliases of this approach is too restrictive for many
common design idioms used in OO programming. E. g., no object could be a member
of two collections simultaneously if either collection was fully protected against
aliases. In this case, one collection would be an island, prohibiting that references
to its members show up outside the island.
In [15], Noble et al. present a more ﬂexible approach to control aliasing when
compared with islands. The approach taken by Noble et al. is to enable aliasing
by introducing explicit aliasing modes. The authors diﬀerentiate between the rep-
resentation of an object, which corresponds to its ﬁelds, and arguments, which are
parameters to methods of the object. The representation of objects should only be
accessible via the object’s interface, e. g., in Java ﬁelds would have to be marked as
private and aliases to them should not be returned via getter methods. The state
of the object should only depend on arguments with an immutable state. If the
state of the object was dependent on the mutable part of arguments to its methods,
the state of the object could be changed by changing the state of the arguments
long after the call, bypassing the objects interface. The approach uses tags to an-
notate types and enables the compiler to enforce the restrictions mentioned on the
creation of aliases. A formalization of this model is discussed by Clarke et al. [5].
Even though both approaches enable ﬂexible alias control, they are designed for a
language without inheritance or subtyping.
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A variant of ownership types is used by Boyapati et al. [3] to prevent data races
and deadlocks by partitioning locks into a ﬁxed number of equivalence classes and
specifying a partial order among these equivalence classes. The type checker then
statically veriﬁes that whenever a thread holds more than one lock, the thread
acquires the locks in descending order. Ownership types are used to ensure that
that the locks that protect an object also protect its encapsulated objects.
The approach of Clarke et al. [4] implements a conﬁnement checker for Java to
solve the domain speciﬁc problem of passing a this reference from one Enterprise
Java Bean component to another component. In EJB access to the internal objects
implementing each Bean must be prevented, and access to the Bean is permitted
only through the container generated wrapper. While conﬁned types are a generic
solution to control aliasing, Clarke et al.’s approach solves an EJB speciﬁc problem.
The work of Fong [11] describes how to translate the notion of conﬁnement,
which is formulated for static analysis of Java source code, to dynamic analysis
of Java Bytecode. The approach retains the conﬁnement annotations made in the
source code at bytecode level. This enables link time checks of conﬁnement rules.
It also describes a form of secure cooperation between mutually suspicious code
units, where, for example, a resource object can be shared between two untrusting
modules while ensuring its conﬁnement to a given domain. The implementation
extends the runtime of the Pluggable Veriﬁcation Modules of the Aegis Research
JVM. Our approach uses static analysis to ensure the conﬁnement properties at
compile time and to immediately inform the user of conﬁnement violations.
In [20], the notion of conﬁned types is formalized in the context of Featherweight
Java (FJ). In FJ, conﬁned types are extended to conﬁned instantiations of generic
classes.
Reverse engineering approaches to the detection of aliasing are described in
[12,16]. Kacheck/J [12] is a tool to infer conﬁnement in Java code and was used to
test the thesis that all package-scoped classes in Java programs should be conﬁned.
About 25% of the classes of their benchmark suite were conﬁned anyway and 45%
could be refactored to be conﬁned just by changing visibility modiﬁers. These
numbers are supported by the ﬁndings of Potanin et al. [16]. They presented metrics
of uniqueness, ownership and conﬁnement by analysing snapshots of Java program’s
object graphs and found that a third of all objects were strongly conﬁned.
7 Summary & Future Work
In future work, we will extend the analysis to implement conﬁned types with sup-
port for generic data types. This would relax the restrictions now posed on the
use of conﬁned types as it enables putting conﬁned types in containers, which are
parameterized using the conﬁned type. Further, we will add support for a more
ﬂexible deﬁnition of protection domains to broaden the range of use of the conﬁne-
ment analysis; e. g., to check Enterprise Java Beans for correctly conﬁning this to
the scope of the bean.
In this paper we have discussed an implementation of an incremental conﬁnement
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analysis realized as an Eclipse plug-in that makes use of the static analysis platform
Magellan. As the performance ﬁgures show, the overhead when always executing
the analysis along with the incremental build process is low enough to be able
to use conﬁned types in day-to-day usage. Further, using Magellan we were able
to overcome the identiﬁed tool adoption barriers while being able to focus on the
implementation of the analysis.
The conﬁned types analysis plug-in is freely available at:
www.st.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/Magellan
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